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NOTES
The Compensating Use Tax and Its Effect
on Multistate Business
A N INCREASING PROBLEM which confronts a substantial segment
of our economy concerns the taxation of business enterprises
whose activities are not confined to a single state. The problem is
best described in terms of the conflicting and competing federal and
state interests involving fiscal and commercial transactions. On a
national scale, it is of vital importance that the commerce and trade
of the country not be fettered by state taxes which operate to deter
an expanding and prosperous economy. On the other hand, recent
years have witnessed an exponential rise in the cost of governmental
services placing severe fiscal pressures on the states. In an effort to
keep revenues in line with expenditures, the states have sought to
implement new taxing schemes, and to preserve and extend the reve-
nue-generating power of traditional tax devices.'
The sales tax continues to account for a substantial share of state
revenues. However, this tax is limited to sales which are actually
consummated in the taxing state and cannot extend to extraterri-
torial sales even where the goods involved are destined for ultimate
use in the taxing state.2 In order to compensate for the loss of sales
tax revenues occasioned by out-of-state purchases, many states have
enacted use taxes.3 Unlike the sales tax which is a tax on the sales
1 Se U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATIS-
TICS OF STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES 1902-1953, at 1 (1955); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES
IN 1964, at 1, 6 (1965).
2 See note 24 inira.
3 The term "use tax" is general in nature and is applied in various situations. For
example, the use tax has been imposed on articles used in interstate commerce. Eastern
Air Transp., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147, 153 (1932). Here,
South Carolina had imposed a license tax on all dealers in gasoline - the tax being
measured by the number of gallons sold within the state. In order to compensate for
this tax, the dealer merely added the amount it was required to pay the state on to the
purchase price of all gasoline which it sold. The complainant taxpayer, who operated
airplanes only in interstate commerce, purchased gasoline for the operation of his planes
at a price which had been inflated by the amount of the state license tax. The Court
sustained the tax, holding that a state tax on goods sold within the taxing state did not
constitute an unconstitutional burden on commerce even though the goods sold were
intended for use in interstate commerce. The use tax also has been applied to articles
transported in interstate commerce. See P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE 134-47 (1953). This Note will deal with the use tax as it is levied
in a third instance - incident to interstate sales. For a discussion of the rationale
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transaction, the compensating use tax is a tax on the privilege of
owning or using property within the taxing state. The following
fact pattern will aid in examining the nature and purpose of such a
tax: State T has a sales tax,4 but neighboring State F has none.
Residents of T generally confine the majority of their purchases to
local sources. However, when confronted with a major purchase it
is likely that the prospective buyers will go "bargain-hunting" into
F and other states. When this out-of-state shopping results in an
actual purchase, the effect on State T will be twofold: (1) it loses
sales tax revenues which would have resulted from in-state pur-
chases; (2) T's merchants, subject to the liability of a sales tax on a
transaction in State T, are placed at a competitive disadvantage with
a seller of the same goods in State F, because the latter's sales are
not subject to any sales taxY Moreover, the legislature of T would
be unable to curb the revenue loss directly, for its taxing power can-
not constitutionally reach purely extraterritorial sales transactions. 6
Thus, by making the purchase beyond -the borders of T, or by "rig-
ging" the transaction so as to make it appear to be an interstate sales
transaction,7 residents of T could make purchases free of state T's
sales tax. It is precisely this type of bargain-hunting against which
the compensatory use tax is directed."
As previously noted, compensating use tax statutes impose a
levy on the privilege of ownership or possession in the use of tan-
which permits states to levy a tax upon interstate commerce, see note 14 infra & ac-
companying text.
4 The sales tax, unlike the use tax, is imposed upon the transfer of ownership or
possession of personal property within the taxing state. See 1 P-H STATE & LOCAL TAX
SERv. 5 92,505 (1962). See generally P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 147-61, n.47.
The use tax, on the other hand, is imposed upon the privilege of ownership or posses-
sion in the use of personal property brought into the taxing state. See note 14 inIra &
accompanying text.
5 Notwithstanding the fact that most states today have enacted sales taxes, dis-
crepancies in the rate of taxation may be sufficient to induce out-of-state purchases. For
example, a resident of Rhode Island, which has a 6 percent sales tax, would save 4
cents on a dollar by purchasing a particular good in a state which has a 2 percent sales
tax, assuming constant transportation costs. See 1 P-H STATE & LOCAL TAX SERV. 5
92,952, at 92,905 (1962).
6 A purely extraterritorial sale does not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with
the taxing state to meet the due process requirements of the 14th amendment See
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 161.
See also notes 33-37 infra & accompanying text.
7 For example, buyer and seller, both residents of State T, could make an agree-
ment whereby the seller would ship the article to an agent in State F. Then, by con-
summating the sale in F, buyer would escape T's sales tax. Of course, the transaction
would be subject to sales tax by State F, but where F has no sales tax or a relatively low
one, the evasive scheme would be profitable.
8 See P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 161.
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gible personal property brought into the taxing jurisdiction9 -
property which would have been subject to 'a sales tax if purchased
within that state. The use tax serves to protect the state from loss
of sales tax revenues and to preserve the competitive position of
local vendors. The rate of the compensating use tax is identical to
that of the local sales tax, and it is generally provided that any
article upon which a sales tax has already been paid in another state
shall not be subject again to the use tax.' ° Although the burden of
the use tax ultimately falls on the purchaser, use tax statutes impose
the burden of collection on out-of-state sellers. To insure that the
tax will be collected, the out-of-state seller is made directly liable for
payment of the tax whether collected or not."
As of 1964 there were 120,000 manufacturing and mercantile
companies engaged in interstate commerce. 2 It is likely that every
9See 1 P-H STATE & LOcAL TAX SERv. 5 92,503, at 92,543 (1962). See also
Mann v. McCarroll, 198 Ark. 628, 130 S.W.2d 721 (1939); Continental Supply Co. v.
Wyoming, 54 Wyo. 185, 88 P.2d 488 (1939).
10 The use tax is intended to complement the local sales tax and, in effect, to reach
those transactions which, in actuality, are not extraterritorial. See note 6 supra. Of
course, a blanket exemption from use tax in State T where a sales tax has already been
paid in State F will not resolve the problem created by differential rates of taxation. See
note 5 supra. If a seller in State F can completely avoid a 6 percent use tax in State T
merely by paying a 2 percent sales tax in State F, State T will continue to lose revenues.
The problem has been solved by an interstate credit system whereby the seller would
receive only a 2 percent use tax credit in State T. See note 93 infra. Today, there are
45 states which have enacted a use tax. 1968 CCH STATE TAX HANDBOOK 651-53.
See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 6201-02 (West Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 120, § 439.1 (Smith-Hurd 1968); MD. ANN. CODE art 81, §§ 372-73 (1965); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3403-1 to -3 (1964).
The rate, basis, and subject matter of the compensating use tax varies from state to
state. The tax is as high as 6 percent in one jurisdiction and as low as 2 percent in
others. The basis of the tax is generally the purchase price of the article subject to the
transaction. In many instances it is provided that certain transactions are exempt from
use taxation, but in the absence of such provisions, the tax is levied on all transactions
involving tangible personal property. In addition to these special transactions, state
statutes exempt certain individuals and businesses from liability of the use tax. Given
that there are 45 states imposing use taxes, each with varying exemptions, bases, and
rates, one can easily appreciate the magnitude of the compliance problems which face
the multistate businesses. For a general survey of the various state sales and com-
plementary use taxes, see 1 P-H STATE & LocAL TAX SERv. 5 92,950, at 92,901-30
(1964).
"See, e.g., A_,. CODE tit. 51, § 788 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §
439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1965); PA. STAT. AN. tit. 72, § 3403-201(a) (1964); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 44-18 to -22 (Supp. 1967). It is often the case that marginal sellers, par-
ticularly small vendors, are unable to collect the tax from purchasers by raising their
prices to reflect the tax. Even where the seller does have the ability to exact the tax, the
administrative costs incident to collection are often prohibitive. Although most use
tax statutes attempt to reimburse the seller for expenses incurred in collecting the tax,
reimbursement is based on a percentage discount system which has a tendency to dis-
criminate against small vendors who have insufficient gross revenues to absorb admin-
istrative costs. See note 78 infra.
12 H.R. REP. No. 1480,88th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91 (1964).
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one of these firms conducting sales operations in foreign states has
been confronted with the imposition of a compensating use tax.
This Note will examine the commercial impact of state use taxes in
the perspective of the constitutional limitations on imposition of
such taxes and the recent attempts by Congress and state legisla-
tures to reduce the burden of compliance through unification of the
variegated state use tax statutes.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPENSATING
USE TAx
A. Early Cases Upholding the Constitutionality of the Use Tax
The constitutionality of the compensating use tax was first up-
held in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co." Plaintiff, a contractor in
the construction business, brought machinery and other materials
which it had purchased from an out-of-state seller into the State of
Washington. The state tax commission imposed a tax upon the use
of the property transported into the taxing state. The court held
that the tax imposed was "not upon the operations of interstate com-
merce, but upon the privilege of use after commerce is at an end,' 14
and therefore did not constitute an unconstitutional restraint on in-
terstate commerce.
Henneford involved a taxpayer who was a purchaser of goods
and a resident of the taxing state. In subsequent years, however,
the states began to levy the compensating use tax upon out-of-state
sellers. The following fact patterns will illustrate those cases in
which the compensating use tax was upheld by the Supreme Court:"
(1) Seller owned no property within State T, but it did maintain
13 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
14 Id. at 582 (emphasis added). If the Court would have considered the tax as a
levy upon the operation of interstate commerce, the tax would have been held invalid
as an unconstitutional burden on commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For ex-
ample, 0 who operates a ferry boat between State T and State F, has its place of busi-
ness in F. T seeks to impose a tax upon the gasoline which 0 consumes in its inter-
state operation. Seventy-five percent of the route is in T although the gasoline was
purchased in F. Such tax is considered unconstitutional as a levy upon the operation
of interstate commerce. However, if the gasoline were purchased in T and T imposed
a tax measured by the gallons of gasoline purchased within T's borders, the tax would
not be upon the operation of interstate commerce because it occurred at a stage which
was too remote from the interstate transit. Compare Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky,
279 U.S. 295 (1929), with Eastern Air Trans., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285
U.S. 245 (1932). See P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 135.
15 For the sake of clarity, T will represent the taxing state and F will represent the
state of the seller. As intimated in note 3 supra, the compensating use tax is levied upon
and collected by the seller. Thus, an out-of-state seller will be placed on a par with
local vendors within State T who are necessarily subject to the state sales tax.
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two employees in the taxing state to solicit orders from residents of
T.16 (2) Seller owned no property within State T, but it sent travel-
ing salesman into T to solicit local orders.17  In holding that fact
patterns (1) and (2) were "indistinguishable,"' 8 the Court ap-
peared to be emphasizing the importance of the organized nature
of the local solicitation in State T - not the form which it as-
sumed." (3) Seller owned no property in T and had no full-time
employees located there. However, it actively conducted continuous
solicitations in State T through "brokers" supplying catalogues, sam-
ples, and other advertising devices to prospective purchasers. A
written agreement between Seller and each broker provided that the
parties intended to create an independent contractor relationship.
The Court held that the distinction between part-time brokers and
full-time employees was insignificant and in so doing upheld the
tax imposed upon the use of the goods purchased by the residents
of the taxing state." (4) Seller maintained a retail store in State T
in which it displayed advertisements relating both to local merchan-
dise and to goods which could be ordered by mail from Seller's home
office in State F. The goods which were obtainable by mail order
were not directly sold in T. In upholding the tax, the Court found
that the mail-order goods were related to the Seller's local activities 1
and went on to note that in this context it was immaterial that "so-
licitation [of mail orders] was done through local advertisement
rather than directly by local agents . 2.2..""
The cases arising after Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.3 indicate
that before a state can constitutionally impose a use tax on an extra-
territorial seller, there must be "some definite link, some minimum
connection between... [the] state and the person, property or trans-
16 See Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306U.S. 62 (1939).
17 See General Trading Co. v. Iowa Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). In addition
to upholding a use tax levied by the state of the purchaser, the Court noted that the re-
quirement that an out-of-state seller collect the use tax from the local purchaser "is a
familiar and sanctioned device." Id. at 338.
18Id.
19 The fact that the seller sends traveling salesmen into the taxing state (rather than
maintaining agents there) will not relieve it from liability for the collection and
payment of the use tax. In both instances the seller's business activities constituted the
transaction of local business, sufficient to justify imposition of the use tax.
20 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207,211 (1960).
21 Nelson v. Montgomery-Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
22 Id. at 376; cf. Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939). Again the
Court looked to the -nature and extent of the local solicitation as opposed to the form
such solicitation takes. See note 19 supra. See also Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
312 U.S. 359 (1941), a companion case to Montgomery-Ward.
23 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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action it seeks to tax."24 In deciding whether the compensating use
tax was validly applied, the Court looked to the out-of-state vendor's
business conduct within the taxing jurisdiction. If a definite con-
nection or relationship between the taxing state and the individual,
property, or transaction it sought to tax were not found to exist, then
the tax was unconstitutional as applied to that transaction, because
of its failure to satisfy -the requirements of due process of law.
Thus, it was clear that if an out-of-state seller maintained a place
of business, or salesmen in the taxing state, or employed independ-
ent contractors to solicit business, it would be subject to use tax-
ation, but if the seller's only contact with the taxing state were ad-
vertising solicitation originating from a foreign state, no tax could
be imposed.25 Nonetheless, the cases arising subsequent to Henne-
ford amply illustrate the need for a final determination of definite
guidelines. The existing guidelines had been created in a case-by-
case manner over a time-span of nearly 30 years. Certain important
questions were left open: Was there a meaningful distinction be-
tween maintaining full-time employees in the taxing state or merely
sending traveling salesmen there? What if the traveling salesmen
were independent contractors? Could the seller make household de-
liveries or must he confine his deliveries to the United States mail or
common carriers? Would the seller be able to advertise through
local media? Could he advertise in any medium which might reach
the residents of the taxing state? The answers to these questions
were never unified in any one decision and consequently, interstate
sellers were compelled -to draw their own conclusions from the
handful of relevant Supreme Court cases. This lack of clarity
posed a serious threat to the expansion of interstate commercial
transactions, for the uncertainties had an inherent inhibiting effect
on multistate sellers. In 1967, the Court attempted to ameliorate
this threat and to restore meaning and certainty to the situation.
B. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue-6 -
The Latest Judicial Interpretation
National Bellas Hess is a large retail establishment incorporated
24 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
25 In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), the seller, a Delaware
corporation, neither owned property nor maintained employees in Maryland, the taxing
state. The seller did advertise on radio and television and in the newspapers; however,
all such advertising was done on Delaware stations and in the Delaware newspapers.
Finding that advertising in a foreign state did not constitute "exploitation of the con-
sumer market" within the taxing state, the Court held that the seller could not be sub-
jected to Maryland's use tax. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
26386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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in Delaware. For years it has operated a national, retail mail order
business with headquarters in North Kansas City, Missouri. Twice
each year Bellas Hess mailed catalogues from its Missouri location
to over 5 million customers residing throughout the United States.
It also mailed out and enclosed sales books and flyers in merchan-
dise. All orders were received in Missouri. Bellas Hess had no
other contacts with Illinois.27
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the assessment of a use tax
on Bellas Hess2 pursuant to the Illinois Use Tax Act.29 On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court was confronted with two closely
related, yet legally distinct questions: (1) Whether the Illinois
statute, as applied to the specific transactions in the case at bar,
constituted a violation of the 14th amendment due process clause.30
(2) Whether the Illinois statute constituted an unconstitutional bur-
den on interstate commerce. 31  In reversing the Illinois Supreme
Court, the Court held against the tax on both issues.
(i) The Due Process Issue. - In essence, the majority opinion
in Bellas Hess reaffirmed the Court's previous position with respect
to the jurisdictional nexus required before a state can validly impose
a use tax on an out-of-state seller. In applying the nexus principle,
the Court's earlier decisions seemed to distinguish out-of-state corpo-
rations which had salesmen or representatives,32 and outlets or prop-
erty3 3 within the taxing state from those firms which were exclusive-
2 7 The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the findings of the trial court to the effect
that Bellas Hess
does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house, sales house, ware-
house or any other place of business; it does not have in Illinois any agent,
salesman, canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or take
orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service merchan-
dise it sells; [it owns] no tangible property, real or personal, in Illinois [and]
it has no telephone listing in Illinois; [nor has it] advertised its merchandise
for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or television in Illinois. De-
partment of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 I1. 2d 164, 166-67,
214 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1966), rev'd, 386U.S. 753 (1967).
Thus, the fact pattern of Bellas Hess does not fit into any of the previous categories
considered by the Court See notes 16-25 supra & accompanying text.
28 34 l1. 2d 164,214 N.E.2d 755 (1966), rev'd, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
29 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 439.1-.51 (Smith-Hurd 1965), provides that the
use tax shall be collected from the purchaser by any retailer "maintaining a place of
business in this State," and makes the obligation a debt of the retailer regardless of
whether the tax is actually collected. Id. § 439.3. The statute defines "maintaining a
place of business" as "[e]ngaging in soliciting of orders within this State from users by
means of catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are received or accepted
within or without this State." Id. § 439.2.
30 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31 Id. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
32 See notes 16-23 sapra & accompanying text.
33 See notes 21 & 22 supra & accompanying text.
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ly out-of-state and whose only contact with the taxing jurisdiction
was by mail, common carrier, local newspaper, radio, television, or
magazine advertisements.3 4 The corporations in the former cate-
gory were susceptible to local use taxation; the corporations in the
latter class were not. The only contacts which Bellas Hess had with
its customers in Illinois were by common carrier and United States
mail, and the Court found this nexus insufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process. 35
As previously disclosed, 36 in each case coming to the Court prior
to Bellas Hess where the tax was upheld, there was a continuous and
complex exploitation of the taxing jurisdiction's market that coin-
cided with the physical contacts established by the seller. This ex-
ploitation could be found only by an examination of the substance,
as well as the form, of the out-of-state vendor's business activity in
the purchaser's state. Query: Did the majority in Bellas Hess look
to the scope and complexity of the seller's business activity (that is,
the substance of the conduct), or did it merely look to the physical
contacts which Bellas Hess established (or failed to establish) with
the taxing state (that is, the form of such conduct) ?3T
The dissent in Bellas Hess attacked the artificial and mechanical
approach which the majority had taken in deriving a definition of
a sufficient jurisdictional nexus. Mr. Justice Fortas viewed the sell-
er's "systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illi-
nois consumer market," as the controlling factor in determining
whether jurisdictional contact had been established. 38  The dissent
would expand the standard to include a scrutinizing analysis of the
vendor's business activities, taking in such considerations as the sell-
34 See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), which held that it was
unconstitutional for Maryland to impose a use tax upon a Delaware seller who had no
retail outlets or sales solicitors in Maryland. The seller in Miller Bros. advertised its
wares in newspapers and on television and radio, and made occassional home deliveries
in the tax paying state, whereas Bellas Hess conined its advertising activities to cata-
logues and occasional flyers sent by United States mail. To the extent that the solicita-
tion activities of the seller in Miller Bros. exceed those employed by Bellas Hess, the
Court's refusal to find the required jurisdictional nexus in Miller Bros. represents a
position more favorable to out-of-state sellers than the Court's decision in Bellas Hess.
35 386 U.S. at 759-60.
36 See notes 16-22 supra.
37 The form of the business activity is evidenced by the actual physical contacts with
the taxing states: for example, ownership of real property in the taxing state (retail
stores, warehouses), or maintenance of employees and other agents who are sent to the
taxing state. The substance of the business activity is evidenced by the overall effect of
the out-of-state seller's conduct on the taxing state (advertising compaigns, use of taxing
state's credit facilities).
38 386 U.S. at 761 (dissenting opinion).
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er's net sales, mailing list, and credit operation in the taxing state. 9
After such examination the dissent concluded that, despite Bellas
Hess' conformity to the pre-existing constitutional guidelines pre-
scribed by the Court, its activities in Illinois satisfied the minimum
contact requirements of the due process clause, and that, therefore,
the tax was constitutional.
40
Of the two approaches to the due process issue and the nexus
criterion, the position advocated by Justice Fortas in his dissenting
opinion appears more formidable and realistic. Certainly the me-
chanical and artificial guidelines which the majority reaffirmed are
likely to be modified in future cases. 41  Regardless of where the dis-
tinctions are made and how sharply they are drawn, no doubt future
cases will arise demanding a further "splitting of hairs," until the
original distinctions become meaningless.
The approach to the jurisdictional issue advocated by Mr. Jus-
tice Fortas considers the effect of a vendor's course of business on
the taxing state rather than the form such business activity takes.
4 2
39 Id.
4 0 Mr. Justice Fortas emphasized the fact that Bellas Hess enjoyed the benefits of,
and the profits from, facilities established and "nurtured by the State of Illinois." Id.
at 762. In exchange for these "benefits," Illinois was entitled to ask for compensation-
via an assessment of a local use tax. Id. at 765. Query whether the benefits to which
Justice Fortas alluded - the right to engage in the business of systematically offer-
ing merchandise for sale in a state in competition with local retailers, and the right to
solicit deferred-payment credit accounts from the taxing state's residents - were in-
direct and not of such magnitude to allow Illinois to levy a tax in exchange for these
benefits. See Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940), where the Court
said that one of the questions to be asked in determining whether an out-of-state busi-
ness must comply with a state tax is "[wJhether the state has given anything for
which it can ask return." Id. at 444.
4 1 For example, the Court might modify the present rule which extends constitu-
tional protection from taxation to corporations whose only contact with the taxing state
is through advertisements which appear only in the mass media of the seller's state. A
feasible modification would be one that disregards the origin of the advertisements and
permits a tax to be imposed when such advertising reasonably would be expected to
reach the consumer in the taxing state. But see Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954).4 2 Sometimes referred to as the "economic exploitation" standard, this test has been
applied in the area of in personam jurisdiction. In Erlangler Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), the court said: "While the due process
test applied to state jurisdiction over nonresidents for taxing purposes is not identical
with the due process test for the exercise over them of state judicial power, the two
present a close parallel." Id. at 506. CoMpare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLiCr
OF LAws § 43 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956), with id. §§ 74-77. In deciding whether a
nondomiciliary corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in a foreign state, the
Supreme Court has looked to the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Court also in-
timated that service of process jurisdiction was very similar to taxation jurisdiction: "The
activities which establish its [the corporation's] presence subject it alike to taxation by
the state and to suit to recover the tax." Id. at 321. The standard for in personam juris-
diction was further expanded in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
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Is it constitutionally material whether the seller continuously solicits
orders in the taxing state through the mails as opposed to soliciting
through salesman or property physically present there? A realistic
business fact of life which the majority in Bellas Hess refused to ac-
cept is that a continuous and direct mail order campaign may be
much more efficient economically than the solicitation of sales
through employees or retail outlets in the taxing jurisdiction. Al-
though the Court's insistence on physical contacts to establish juris-
dictional nexus may add some certainty to the law, it ignores eco-
nomic reality.
(ii) The Commerce Clause Issue.4 3 - The Supreme Court has
long recognized the difficulty in distinguishing the concepts of "due
process" and "commerce" as they relate to the states' power to tax.
In 1941, Mr. Justice Ruledge admitted that the two concepts do over-
lap to some extent:
If there is a want of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone
any burden the tax imposes on the commerce among the States be-
comes "undue." But, though overlapping, the two conceptions are
not identical. There may be more than sufficient factual connections,
with economic and legal effects, between the transaction and the tax-
ing State to sustain the tax as against due process objections. Yet the
tax may fail because of its burdening effect upon the commerce.44
There is little doubt that the majority in Bellas Hess was sensi-
tive to the imminent threat to mail-order businesses and to interstate
commerce as a whole, presented by the broad Illinois Use Tax Act.
The greatest burden on interstate commerce which generally threat-
ens every corporation whose livelihood depends upon interstate sales
is the burden created by the compliance requirements of state use
(1957), where jurisdiction was satisfied without any physical presence in the foreign
state. In light of the striking similarity between jurisdiction for the purpose of taxation
and jurisdiction for the purpose of exercising judicial power, the Court in Bellas Hess
could easily have adopted the economic exploitation test in lieu of the archaic and artifi-
cial standard demanding physical nexus. See Hazard, A General Theory of State Court
Jurisdiction, SUPREME COURT REVIEW 241 (P. Kurland ed. 1965); Shepherd, How
Long is the Long Arm of Due Process, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 297 (1967); Smithers,
Virginia's "Long Arm" Statute: An Argument for Constitutionality of Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Individuals, 51 VA. L. REv. 712 (1965); Comment, Jurisdiction: "Long
Arm" Expansion, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 443 (1966); Comment, Expanded in Personam
Jurisdiction - Due Process and the Tennessee L. A. Stat., 33 TENN. L REV. 371
(1966).
43 For a basic understanding of the interpretation of the commerce clause as it per-
tains to the state's ability to affect interstate commerce, see Norton, Scope of the Com-
merce Cluase As Evidenced in the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 31
ICC PRAC. J. 374 (1964); Light, The Federal Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 717
(1963).
44 International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1941)
(concurring opinion).
COMPENSATING USE TAX
tax statutes. 45 This burden manifests itself through the various col-
lection duties cast upon the out-of-state seller, who is often situated
a great distance from the taxing jurisdiction. For example, the out-
of-state seller must comply with various accounting procedures, keep
detailed records of sales made in the different jurisdictions, and de-
termine, charge, and collect whatever tax is imposed.4 6  Further-
more, each state has its own procedural requirements and the out-of-
state seller who makes sales in many states must be acquainted with
these variegated, and many times, inconsistent procedures. When
the compliance duties demanded by a particular state become so
onerous that the out-of-state vendor is discriminated against in his
interstate business activity, there is an undue burden upon interstate
commerce.47  Such an undue burden was found to exist in Bellas
4 5 Another burden arises from the possibility that an out-of-state vendor could be
taxed twice for the same transaction. Commonly referred to as the "multiple burdens
doctrine," this theory was first articulated by Mr. Justice Stone in Western Livestock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). Under this doctrine a corporation in State F
which sells to a customer in State T could conceivably be taxed for the sale in State F
and also be liable for collection of a use tax in State T. In effect, this would discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce because a local retailer whose sole business is in State
T would be assessed only one tax, the state sales tax, thus giving it a competitive ad-
vantage over the out-of-state seller who is incorporated in State P but does business in
State T. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954);
Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Barrett, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce - "Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What
Have You?, 4 VAND. L REv. 496, 506-55 (1951).
The possibility of multiple burdens has been virtually eliminated, since most states
have adopted a more or less uniform regulation or administrative practice recommended
by the National Association of Tax Administrators. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF TAX
ADMINISTRATORS REP. No. 10, PROPOSED UNIFORM REGULATION FOR TAXATION
OF INTERSTATE TRANSACTIONS UNDER STATE SALES TAX LAws (1940). This prac-
tice exempts an out-of-state seller from a sales tax imposed by its own state on a transac-
tion pursuant to a contract requiring shipment from seller's state to buyer's state. Such
a transaction is left subject to a use tax by the customer's state and duplication is
avoided. However, these taxing procedures are administrative, not statutory, and thus
readily subject to change. Of greater consequence is the fact that the Supreme Court
has never specifically stated that a multiple burden is prohibited, and presently only
a voluntary state tax compact avoids the possibility of double taxation. Since only
28 states have joined the compact, the potential for a multiple burden affecting non-
member states cannot be dismissed until Congress passes legislation which clearly sets
forth which state - seller's or buyer's - may impose what tax and under what cir-
cumstances. See Kust & Sale, State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 46 VA. L. REV. 1290,
1302 (1960). Until Congress does act, the out-of-state vendor will face a possibility that
his business activity may be subjected to a double tax. For discussion of recent con-
gressional activity in this area see part II of this Note.
4 6 H.R. REP. No. 563, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
47 See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760
(1967) where the Court noted that:
The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in adminis-
trative and recordkeeping requirements could entangle National's interstate
... business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions
with no legitimate claim to impose "a fair share of the cost of the local gov-
ernment."
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Hess: "[I]f the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon
National were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free con-
duct of its interstate business would be neither imaginary nor re-
mote."'48  That the burden of complying with numerous and often
inconsistent state use tax statutes is indeed not imaginary or remote
is documented by recent congressional studies and legislative hear-
ings which are discussed in greater detail in Part II of this Note.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM
DEALING WITH STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
A. Developments Leading to Public Law 86-272"9
Prior to 1959, the responsibility for resolving conflicts between
state taxing policies and the paramount federal interest in the un-
hampered flow of commerce was shouldered completely by the ju-
diciary. During this period there existed no federal legislation to
guide the courts.5" Consequently, each state extended its jurisdic-
tional reach further and further beyond its borders to levy taxes up-
on more and more interstate firms. It became increasingly evident
that the case-by-case process of judicial determination was inade-
quate to police the growing complex of state taxes." The need for
48 386 U.S. at 760.
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1964).
50 Congress had exercised its powers under the commerce clause in other fields of
state taxation. The few steps it did take resulted in an enlargement rather than a cur-
tailment of state taxing powers. This policy of liberalizing the state taxing authority
was manifested in three federal statutes: (1) Federal Unemployment Tax Act, INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3301-08 (employment tax imposed on employers); (2) Jen-
kins Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-78 (1964) (permitting states to regulate interstate commerce
by requiring vendors of cigarettes to give tax collecting aid to other states). This statute
was upheld in Consumer Mail Order Ass'n v. McGrath, 340 U.S. 925 (1951), rehearing
denied, 341 U.S. 906 (1952); (3) McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958) (state
regulation of insurance). In these three statutes, Congress exercised its power over
interstate commerce to augment state taxation, and in essence was doing for the states
what they were constitutionally unable to do for themselves. What Congress failed to
achieve was a clear definition of the limits of state taxing power.
51 There have been six Supreme Court Justices who have subscribed to the view that
Congress should act to achieve the necessary balance between state revenue requirements
and the national need for an open market: (1) Mr. Justice Black in McCarroll v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940) (dissenting opinion); Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 448-55 (1939) (dissenting opinion);
J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 327 (1938) (dissenting opinion); (2)
Mr. Justice Clark in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 457-58 (1959); (3) Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting in McCarroll; (4) Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944); dis-
senting in Northwestern States and McCarroll; (5) Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in
Northwest Airlines; (6) Mr. Justice Rutledge in International Harvester Co. v. Depart-
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congressional action had arisen."
The impetus for congressional action came in 1958 when the
Supreme Court held that in the absence of a federal statute, a com-
pany could be compelled to pay a state income tax, even where en-
gaged solely in interstate commerce in the taxing state." A harsh
reaction to this decision emanated from the business community,54
and within weeks after the decision, Congress responded to the mul-
tistate business reaction. Hearings were conducted by the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business 5 Simultaneously, both the
Senate Finance Committee56 and the House Judiciary Committee57
reported out bills to afford immediate relief while Congress could
develop a more comprehensive program supported by detailed testi-
mony and data. The result of the congressional investigations was
Public Law 86-272, 58 providing that no state may impose an income
ment of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 360 (1944) (concurring opinion); General Trading Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 360 (1944) (concurring opinion); McLeod v.
J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 360 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
52 On the eve of congressional action, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made the following
observation regarding the respective roles of Congress and the judiciary in policing
state taxes affecting commerce:
At best, the Court can only act negatively; it can determine whether a
specific state tax is imposed in violation of the Commerce Clause. Such de-
cisions must necessarily depend on the application of rough and ready legal
concepts. We cannot make a detailed inquiry into the incidence of diverse
economic burdens in order to determine the extent to which such burdens
conflict with the necessities of national economic life. Neither can we devise
appropriate standards for dividing up national revenue on the basis of more or
less abstract principles of constitutional law, which cannot be responsive to the
subtleties of the interrelated economies of Nation and State.
The problem calls for solution by devising a congressional policy. Con-
gress alone can provide for a full and thorough canvassing of the multitudi-
nous and intricate factors which compose the problem of the taxing freedom
of the States and the needed limits of such state taxing power. Northwes-
tern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476-77 (1959)
(dissenting opinion).
53 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
Until this decision there had been a widely accepted view in the business community
that a company could not be taxed by a state unless it engaged to some extent in
intrastate commerce within the taxing state. See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1964).
54The small and moderate-sized interstate corporations were pierced with a double-
edged sword. Not only were they faced with the prospect of complying with the com-
plex and diverse income tax laws with which they were unable to cope, but these cor-
porations also were confronted with the grave prospect of deficiency assessments for
back years. In Northwestern, for example, the taxpayer was held liable for back taxes
covering a period of 16 years.
S5 Hearings on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
56 S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reporting S. 2524.
57 H.RJ. RES. No. 936, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reporting H.J. REs. 450.
58 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1964).
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tax on a foreign corporation whose only business activity in the tax-
ing state consists of the solicitation of orders for sales of personal
property to be accepted outside the state and to be filled by ship-
ments from a point outside the state. The statute further provides
that for purposes of state income taxation, a company is not to be
deemed "engaged in business" within the taxing state merely by
reason of the fact that it employs independent contractors owning
property within the state to solicit orders for out-of-state sales. 59
Several months after the enactment of Public Law 86-272, the
Court came down with Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,6 ° holding that Florida
could constitutionally impose upon a Georgia seller the duty of col-
lecting a state use tax upon the sale of goods shipped to customers
in Florida where the seller employed 10 salesmen in Florida to so-
licit orders which were forwarded to the company's Georgia office
for acceptance. Scripto met with a response from the business com-
munity similar to the response that precipitated Public Law 86-272.
Again demonstrating sensitivity to these reactions, Congress enacted
legislation which broadened the congressional study of state taxing
practices to include sales and use taxes and other taxes relating to
interstate commerce. 61
B. Congressional Studies Arising out of Public Law 86-272
Early in 1961 the Special Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee convened for the purpose of developing "a body of fac-
tual information . . . as to the number and characteristics of inter-
state companies, the pattern of their activities across state lines, the
cost of complying with State and local tax laws, the degree to which
they were able to comply, and the effect on businesses and State
revenues of various possible remedial proposals.""2  The study, re-
puted to be one of the most comprehensive ever undertaken by the
Congress,13 was published in four volumes over 4 years. 4  It
59 Id.
60 362 U.S. 207 (1960). For a more detailed analysis of the facts and holding of
Scripto, see text accompanying note 20 supra.
61 Pub. L. 88-42, 77 Stat. 67 (1963).
6 2 H.R. REP. No. 69, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
63 See Celler, The Development of a Congressional Program Dealing With State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 385,389 (1967).
6 4 SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., vols. 1 & 2 (1964); H.R. REP.
No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 3 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., vol. 4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as REPORT).
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showed that the present state system governing the taxation of cor-
porations dealing in interstate commercial transactions was defec-
tive in several major respects: (1) The system was plagued with a
preponderance of noncompliance and nonenforcement. 5 (2) There
was a tendency to result in overtaxation in some instances and un-
dertaxation in others.66 (3) Many states discriminated in favor of
local sellers by affording them benefits which were unavailable to
out-of-state competitors.67  (4) The system promoted a widespread
feeling of disrespect for the state and local laws, especially among
small and moderate-sized firms. 8 The results of the study were so
alarming that extensive congressional hearings were ordered to
probe more deeply into the restraints on interstate commerce inher-
ent in state taxing policies and practices.
C. Congressional Hearings on Taxation of Interstate Commerce
During 1966, extensive hearings were conducted before the Spe-
cial Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the
House Judiciary Committee.6 ' Few witnesses, even those represent-
ing different interest groups, actually contributed "hard" facts. The
testimony was subjective and manifested personal points of view.
Nevertheless, certain themes recurred throughout the hearings.7"
It was the general consensus among state tax administrators that the
federal government had no jurisdiction to interfere in the area of
state taxation. This proposition disregarded the fact that in recent
years many Supreme Court Justices had subscribed to the view that
the judicial system was inadequate to deal with the problems of
multistate taxation.7 Another recurring theme reflected the belief
65 Celler, supra note 63, at 389. The study revealed that in the sales and use tax
area there was no return filed in 93.5 percent of the cases in which tax liability ex-
isted. REPORT supra note 64, vol. 3, at 729. Many of the corporations which did file
returns were found to be in derogation of the compliance requirements. Id.
6 6 See Celler, supra note 63, at 390.
67Id. See also REPORT, supra note 64, vol. 4, at 1127-28. In the sales and use tax
area it was found that some states were taxing products made outside the taxing state,
while granting exemptions to in-state manufacturers of the same product. Id., vol. 3,
at 820.
6 8 See Celier, supra note 63, at 390. See also REPORT, supra note 64, vol. 4, at
1128.
69 Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited
as 1966 Hearings].
70 See Dane, A Solution to the Problem of State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
12 VILL. L REv. 507, 509-15 (1967). One theme was that the states, in a matter of
time, would unite and enact a uniform statute for the allocation of income among the
states for taxing purposes. Id. at 510.
71 See note 51 supra.
19691
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 597
that the imposition of all-encompassing use taxes on multistate busi-
ness operations, without uniformity and under diverse recording pro-
cedures, placed a grave burden on the nation's free economy. 2
To illustrate the complexity of the compliance problems faced by
multistate businesses, the following example was cited in the hear-
ings. If a California postcard manufacturer sells cards in another
state to a distributor for resale, it need not collect the California
sales tax; but if the same cards are sold to a hotel that distributes
them for no charge, the card manufacturer must collect a sales tax
for this portion of his business.73  On many occasions the out-of-
state vendor is not able to determine whether a specific item he sells
was purchased for resale or for use in the buyer's trade or business."
Indeed, the ultimate disposition of the goods is often unknown even
to the buyer. Thus, it is apparent that in many instances the out-of-
state vendor does not know the facts necessary to determine whether
or not the tax applies. 5 The sale may be for resale, or it may be of
an exempt item, or to an exempt purchaser. Although the in-state
buyer is likely to be aware of these facts, the out-of-state seller
usually is not. The burden of ascertaining relevant sales informa-
tion is particularly acute for mail-order businesses. Small mail-order
houses do not keep records of sales by states, and to require them to
do so would impose an unjustified hardship upon them.76 The
added expense due to more detailed record keeping would constitute
a heavy burden.77
72 One businessman testified that 35 states and the District of Columbia required
compensating use taxes, and that among these 35 states, five separate standards for use
tax application are employed: "Five states required [the tax if seller) . . . 'maintain[ed)
a place of business' in the [taxing) State; 5 used 'agent operating' in the State as the
test, and 12 added 'agent operating temporarily.'" Three more used "solicitation" by
"agent" as a standard. The fifth and most drastic test required collection of the use tax
by out-of-state sellers who advertise by means of distribution of catalogues into the tax-
ing state. 1966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 219. The last test would clearly fall within
the constitutional proscription of Bellas Hess. See note 35 supra & accompanying text.
73 1966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 465.
74 Id. at 61.
75 See Comment, Use Tax Collection: National Bellas Hess and the Congressional
Reports, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 373, 385-86 (1968), where it is noted that: "The ability to
determine whether a particular sale is subject to a use tax requires constant checking of
state court decisions and announcements by state tax administrators."
761966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 224.
77 Another aspect of the compliance problem was presented by a representative of
the American Book Publisher's Council, Inc. who pointed out that state taxing laws
requiring companies to collect state taxes on small purchases would subject the book
publishing industry to severe hardships. The seller would be required to analyze its
sales by states. This particular witness' company issued approximately 5 million in-
voices per year to over 1 million different customers throughout the 50 states. Each
invoice would require a tax determination and computation, and the millions of remit-
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Conceding that in some instances an out-of-state seller may have
a competitive advantage over the in-state merchant, the strict en-
forcement of the burdens of use tax collection requirements would
probably drive marginal firms out of the market.78  The possibility
of a competitive advantage accruing to an out-of-state seller may
very well be the price that must be paid in order to insure the free
flow of interstate commerce. Furthermore, the out-of-state seller
many times is not in competition with in-state corporations.79 In-
deed, testimony at the hearings indicated that mail order firms do a
substantial amount of business in goods which are not available in
local markets. 0 In general, the results of the 1966 congressional
tances would have to be grouped and added according to state. In view of the compara-
tively small amount of the average invoice ($5.00), the burden of compliance would
have severe consequences. Many of the book clubs have even smaller averages. Even
though the comparable volume figures for the smaller clubs would be less than for large
publishers, the burden of complying with the clerical procedures would be more seri-
ous because these smaller clubs operate with smaller clerical staffs and without the
help of sophisticated business machines. Id. at 605.
78 The testimony gathered at the congressional hearings indicated that only some of
the large mail-order houses - and they comprise a small minority - would be able to
cope with variegated state taxes imposed on interstate transactions. The remaining
interstate corporations would find it almost impossible to comply with the burdens
imposed by the taxing authorities of the states. The expense alone involved in familiar-
izing themselves with the technicalities of divergent tax laws would discourage these
firms from entering many states. Such firms would be compelled to hire lawyers and
accountants to prepare and file various tax returns and to negotiate with tax administra-
tors. See Studenski, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Com-
merce - An Economist's View-Point, 46 VA. L. REv. 1121, 1138-39 (1960).
The magnitude of the burden of use tax collection was well articulated in the state-
ment of Mr. James M. Alter. 1966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 1438-46. Mr. Alter esti-
mated that the cost of complying with the various use tax provisions imposed by the
many states in which he sells amounted to one-half of 1 percent of his gross sales, and 50
percent of the net profits of the company after taxes. To meet this burden of compli-
ance, many states grant the seller-collector some compensation in the form of allowing
the seller to retain a part of the tax collected. For example, the Illinois statute provides
for a "discount of 2% or $5 per calendar year, whichever is greater ... to reimburse
the retailer for expenses incurred in collecting the tax, keeping records, preparing and
filing xeturns, remitting the tax and supplying data ...." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 439.9 (Smith-Hurd 1965). Although the average allowance is 3 percent of the total
tax collected by the seller, it is not sufficient to completely offset compliance costs.
REPORT, supra note 64, vol. 3, at 701-02. See also dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
474 (1959), noting that for small interstate sellers, the cost of compliance may often
exceed the amount of tax revenue derived.
79 Testimony of an officer of a Detroit mail order firm. 1966 Hearings, supra
note 69, at 510-11.
80 Mr. James A. Alter of Chicago testified:
The local wholesaler has the advantage of proximity, speed and friendship
and many other factors - that give him a competitive advantage. We are
able to do business in these other States only because we carry a very large in-
ventory of many esoteric items, and when a customer in a distant State needs
something he can't order locally, he orders it from us. He certainly doesn't
order from us something he can get locally. Id. at 1445.
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hearings reaffirmed the findings of the previous study to the effect
that the complex of diverse, inconsistent, and discriminatory com-
pensating use taxes imposed by the states on multistate business did
indeed result in a serious obstruction to the free flow of interstate
commerce.
D. The Interstate Taxation Bill
(i) Congressional History.- Soon after the completion of the
congressional hearings by the Special Subcommittee in the 89th Con-
gress, the House Judiciary Committee reported out a proposed Inter-
state Taxation Act." Immediately thereafter Congress adjourned
and the bill was introduced in the 90th Congress as H.R. 2158.82
On March 7, 1967, the House Judiciary Committee favorably re-
ported the bill and it was sent to the Rules Committee for debate 4
months later.8" The bill passed the House of Representatives on
May 22, 1968, by a roll call vote, and was presented to the Senate
Finance Committee for debate. In this committee the bill "died"
when the 90th Congress adjourned for the year on October 14,
19 68 .
84 The failure of H.R. 2158 to become law was an unfortu-
nate event for those desiring a unification of the many state statutes
regarding the state taxation of interstate commerce. This year the
bill will begin anew and will be subjected to the vigorous and pain-
ful legislative processes of the 91st Congress. However, the outlook
for the bill's success is not totally forlorn. Since it did pass the
House last term, there is a good chance it will do so again and pos-
sibly in less time than was required in the 90th Congress. Because
of the certainty that H.R. 2158 (or a similar bill) will be reintro-
duced in the current session of Congress, an examination of its pro-
visions is essential to a comprehensive understanding of the con-
gressional attitude toward state taxation of multistate businesses.
(ii) Jurisdiction to Tax - Business Location Standard.-
Reaffirming this position, a representative of the New England Mail Order Associa-
tion testified that practically every mail-order business aside from the giants is based
on the unusual products that have not reached the local stores. Id. at 1321-22.
81 H.R. 16491, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The predecessor of this bill, H.R.
11798, merely restated the findings of the hearings, and did not contain the compre-
hensive plan for federal regulation of state taxation proposed by H.R. 16491.
82 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as H-.R. 2158].
83 CCH CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 5561 (1968). There were several amendments re-
ported with the bill which were later incorporated therein. See H.R. REP. No. 69, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
84 P-H FED. TAXES REP. BULL. No. 45, 5 5102, at 5100 (Nov. 7, 1968) [herein-
after cited as REP. BULL.].
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Section 101 of the bill establishes a uniform jurisdictional standard 85
for the four taxes covered in the bill: corporate income taxes, capi-
tal stock taxes, sales and use taxes, and gross receipts taxes. Pursu-
ant to section 101, a state or political subdivision may not impose a
sales or use tax with respect to a sale of tangible personal property
unless the seller has a business location in the state or regularly
makes household deliveries in the state." The concept of maintain-
ing a business location is defined as owning or leasing real prop-
erty within the taxing jurisdiction, having one or more employees
located in the state, or regularly maintaining a stock of tangible per-
sonal property in the state for sale in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. 87  The method of determining whether an employee is located
in a particular state was set out in section 513 providing that an
employee is located "in" the taxing state only where the employee's
services are performed exclusively within the state or the employee
has his base of operations within the state and performs some ser-
vices there. Under section 513, an employee would not be located
within the taxing state where he does not have his base of opera-
tions in the state and merely solicits orders for acceptance outside
the state.88
(iii) Title III - Sales and Use Taxes.- This portion of H.R.
2158 contains several provisions designed to reduce multiple sales
85 H.1L 2158, § 101 describes what business conduct would subject the out-of-state
vendor to the taxing state's jurisdiction. With one major exception, the bill codifies
the due process jurisdictional nexes criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in cases
up to and including Bellas Hess. See note 88 infra.
8G-R. 2158, § 101. Household delivery is further defined as the delivering of
goods by the seller, other than by mail or common carrier, to the dwelling of his pur-
chasers. Id. § 514. The household deliveries portion of section 101 only applies to
sales and use taxes.
87Id. § 511. This definition of "business location" is the result of an amendment
to the original proposal. The amended- bill also expands the states' taxing jurisdiction
to include the "regular maintenance of a stock of tangible personal property held for
sale in the ordinary course of business." H.R. REP. No. 69, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1967).
88 R-R. 2158 § 513. But se Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), which
held that there was no constitutional distinction between full-time employees soliciting
orders in the taxing jurisdiction and part-time independent brokers doing the same.
Section 513 would seem to overrule Scripto. The exemption from use tax collection for
sellers who maintain salesmen permanently located out-of-state has been icriticized on
the grounds that it would permit a company v¢ith an organized sales force to minimize
use tax burdens without losing any sales effectiveness. See Comment, supra note 75,
at 394.
In other respects, H.R. 2158 codifies the existing case law regarding the jurisdic-
tional standards. See notes 16-25 supra & accompanying text. The bill adoits the
guidelines articulated by the majority opinion in Bellas Hess; nowhere in the bill does
it appear that the "economic exploitation standard,' stressed by the dissent in Bellas
Hess, was considered. See text accompanying note 42 supra. ;
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taxation and aid the seller in complying with the duty of collection.
Section 301 stipulates that an interstate sale must have its destina-
tion in the taxing state before an out-of-state seller may be required
to collect a use tax with respect to the sale."' A second provision
aiding the out-of-state seller provides that a use tax may not be im-
posed on a seller who has no business location ° in the state or on an
individual without a dwelling place in the state." A third protec-
tion extended to the interstate seller takes the form of a credit which
must be given by a taxing state to an out-of-state seller for prior
taxes it has paid with respect to the same transaction."2 The credit
system is intended to avoid the double taxation that would result
should a sale be subject to sales tax in one state and subject to use
tax in the state of destination.93
Title III also strives to reduce the burdens of tax collection on
interstate sellers. For example, section 304 provides that certificates
or other written evidence from the buyer indicating that a particular
transaction is nontaxable would conclusively exempt the seller from
both paying and collecting the tax.94 Further, if a seller receives
notice from the buyer that the latter is registered with the state for
sales tax purposes, the seller would be relieved of his collection re-
sponsibilities.95 Finally, H.R. 2158 eliminates the seller's bookkeep-
ing burden of collecting or reporting sales or use taxes on sales ac-
cording to geographic location within the taxing state.96
89 Section 301 further provides, however, that a state other than the state of destina-
tion may require the seller to collect a sales or use tax in behalf of the state of destina-
tion even though no household deliveries have been made to, and no business location
has been maintained in, the taxing state.
90 See notes 85-89 supra & accompanying text.
91 "'Dwelling place' is intended [to denote] less than State residence, but more than
mere transient status with a State." H.R. REP. No. 69, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
The bill was not intended to affect existing case law concerning the question of when a
given use of property could be considered to be within a state for tax purposes. Id.
9 2 H.R. 2158, § 301. This credit provision also requires refunds in the event a sales
tax is paid to the seller after a use tax has been paid in another state.
93 See note 45 supra. Although the credit system would not remove the "cumula-
tive impact on multistate sellers of variations in taxing bases, filing and reporting re-
quirements and statutory interpretation," it has been suggested that solutions to these
problems should best be left to cooperative agreements among the states. See Com-
ment, supra note 75, at 395.
94 H.R. 2158, § 304. This provision reflects the consensus among interstate sellers
that the burden of ascertaining whether or not a particular sale is taxable in the buyer's
state can be rigorous, especially when the seller is miles away from the taxing jurisdic-
tion. See note 72 supra & accompanying text.
95 H.R. 2158, § 304. In this instance, the taxing state would pursue the buyer for
the tax.
96 Id. § 305. This exemption does not apply to situations where the seller has a
business location or makes household deliveries in a political subdivision. Here the out-
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(iv) Constitutionality of Federal Legislation in the Area of
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce.- If a bill such as H.R. 2158
ever does become an enacted law, its constitutionality may be ques-
tioned. There have been numerous asides by past and present Su-
preme Court Justices to the effect that the problem of regulating
state taxation of interstate commerce is legislative rather than judi-
cial. 7 There is little doubt that Congress, in the exercise of its com-
merce powers, would be able to supercede otherwise valid state regu-
lation. 8 In the interests of a uniform national policy, Congress has
invoked the commerce power to preempt state regulation in many
areas of local concern where commerce is affected, 9 including local
taxation."' The authorities concur that under its plenary powers
over interstate commerce, Congress can either authorize interstate
taxation by the states as it sees fit, or it can prevent "facets of state
taxation, otherwise valid," when it uses its power as the "founda-
tion for the establishment of national policy over interstate com-
merce." '11 In light of the foregoing authorities, it would appear
that the constitutionality of H.R. 2158 would not be open to serious
question.
Whether H.R. 2158 will be enacted in the 91st Congress in its
present form is unclear. By establishing a uniform jurisdictional
standard for the imposition of state use taxes, and by eliminating
much of the reporting complexities and the potential for double tax-
ation inherent in the present system of unregulated state taxes, the
bill goes a long way toward easing the burdens on the multistate
seller and promoting a freer flow of commerce. Whatever the fate
of H.R. 2158, there exists today a pressing need for some national
guidelines which will permit interstate businesses to pay their share
of-state seller would have to account specifically for interstate sales with destinations in
that subdivision. H.R. REP. No. 69, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1967).
97 See note 51 supra.
98 "[Congress] may either permit the States to regulate the [interstate) commerce
in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible... or exclude state regulation
even of matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate com-
merce." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). See also P. HART-
,iAN, STATE TAXATIoN OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 247-57 (1953).
99 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) (manufacture of butter
regulated pursuant to state statute); New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922)
(state regulation of railroad fares for trains operating intrastate); Railroad Comm'n v.
Chicago B. & O.R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (state regulation of railroad fares for
trains operating intrastate); cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
100 See McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
lol Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Multistate Business, 13
VAND. L. REV. 21, 120-22 (1959). See also Hellerstein, The Power of Congress to
Restrict State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 12 J. TAx 302 (1960).
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of state and local taxes, and, at the same time, afford them a long-
awaited liberation from the burdens of multiple, unwarranted tax-
ation.
III. THE MULTISTATE COMPACT
Realizing both the imminent need for some form of unity in the
field of multistate taxation and the relatively slow progress of fed-
eral legislation, 14 states1 2 decided to formulate a Multistate Tax
Compact which would govern their activities with respect to the tax-
ation of interstate commerce among member states. The compact,
in the form of a model statute, is managed by the Multistate Com-
pact Commission, which is comprised of one member from each
member state. The Commission is empowered to conduct research
studies and to recommend proposals for the furtherance of uniform-
ity in state and local tax laws. The Commission exercises no au-
thority over the member states except in the arbitration of disputes
which arise between a taxpayer and a member state. 03 The com-
pact is directed to state income, capital stock, sales, and use taxes,
but is authorized to expand coverage into other areas of multistate
fiscal concern.' 4
The Multistate Compact defines the use tax as a nonrecurring
levy which is "imposed on... the exercise or enjoyment of any right
or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership,
possession or custody of that property ...."105 Other than this defi-
nitional provision,1 6 there are only two other sections of the model
statute pertaining to the sales and use taxes to which the member
states are bound: (1) a section providing for a tax credit accruing
to any purchaser of tangible personal property who has previously
paid a sales or use tax with respect to the same property in another
10 2 The member states of the compact are Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, and
Washington. Alabama has adopted the compact subject to legislative consent. There
are 13 "associate members" who have all the rights of the other parties except the right
to vote or to hold an office in the Multistate Tax Commission. REP. BULL., supra note
84, 5 5150, at 5201.
103 The Commission is authorized to adopt uniform regulations including regula-
tions defining jurisdiction to tax. All party states take part in this process through
officially-designated representatives (one per state). Party states are not obligated to
accept the regulations adopted by the Commission, but prompt acceptance is strongly
encouraged. Id. 5 5105, at 5104.
104Id. at 5102.
105 Id. 5 6311, at 6301.
100 Each party state and associate state has adopted and accepted the model statute
and has recognized it as binding upon the others. However, the jurisdictional regula-
tion referred to in note 109 infra is merely a proposal.
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state or subdivision;'1 7 (2) a section providing for relief from lia-
bility for a sales or use tax to a vendor who receives a certificate or
other written evidence of an exemption from the appropriate taxing
authority."0 8 With respect to the jurisdictional standard regarding
the imposition of a sales or use tax, there is a proposed regulation
presently being considered for adoption, the substance of which
bears a strong resemblance to the jurisdictional standard of H.R.
2158.109
One immediate benefit of the Multistate Tax Compact is that
it is taking effect presently whereas any relevant federal legislation
will have to survive the long and arduous legislative prcess. In ad-
dition, the compact possesses a certain flexibility which will allow
for modification and improvement when such a need arises; modifi-
cation of any federal law will again be subjected to the processes
of Congress. Despite the fact that the compact achieves a unity
only to the extent of the number of participating states, there has
been a recent trend toward a growing membership, and until Con-
gress comes forth with a federal statute, the Compact will serve a
useful purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the developing case law, the congressional studies and
hearings, and the existing and proposed state and federal legisla-
tion, it has become apparent that the need for uniform legislation
in the area of state taxation of interstate commerce is imminently
107 Id. 5 6333, at 6306.
108 Id. 5 6334, at 6306. This provision is strikingly similar to the one included in
Title III of H.R. 2158. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
109 A vendor is required to pay or collect and remit the tax imposed by this Act
[includes the use tax) if within this state he directly or by a subsidiary or by an
agent:
1. Has or utilizes an office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse, ser-
vice enterprise or other place of business; or
2. Maintains a stock of goods; or
3. Regularly solicits orders whether or not such orders are accepted in this
state, unless the activity in this state consists solely of solicitation by di-
rect mail or advertising via newspapers, radio or television; or
4. Regularly engages in the delivery of property in this state other than by
common carrier or U. S. mail; or
5. Regularly engages in any activity in connection with the leasing or ser-
vicing of property located within this state. REP. BULL., supra note
84, g 5950, at 5803.
Under this proposed jurisdictional test, solicitation by out-of-state salesmen would sub-
ject the foreign seller to use tax collection. Compare H. R. 2158, § 513, which ex-
pressly exempts out-of-state sellers who solicit orders within the taxing state through
nonresident salesmen. See note 88 supra & accompanying text.
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 597
pressing. Thus far, due to concerted pressure by state tax adminis-
trators and others who believe that congressional legislation in this
field would constitute federal encroachment, attempts by Congress
to pass a compromise measure have failed."' Until federal legisla-
tion becomes a reality, the needed unity will have to be provided by
state compacts - compacts which must be far-reaching both sub-
stantively and geographically.
Any legislation - federal or multistate - must, in addition to
providing mechanical jurisdictional guidelines, consider the "exploi-
tation standard" espoused by the dissenting opinion in Bellas
Hess."' Notwithstanding that a test of this kind is difficult to
apply, it is a prerequisite to the achievement of a meaningful bal-
ance between the state interests and those of the interstate busi-
nesses. New legislation in this field must also pay careful attention
to the interests of many small and medium-sized interstate compan-
ies which have been prejudiced by heavy compliance burdens which,
in effect, operate as undue restraints on the free flow of commerce.
Implementation of uniform standards in the area of use tax collec-
tion will reduce the burdens of compliance, and the present trend
toward a balkanized domestic economy can be curbed. Whether
these pressing demands are met by state legislation in the form of
multistate tax compacts, or whether they are dealt with by means of
federal legislation, it remains evident that the problem of state tax-
ation of interstate commerce has sweeping ramifications and that a
nationally-oriented program must evolve to resolve the inherent
problems of the unworkable system which exists today.
JAMES M. KLEIN
110 See note 84 sapra & accompanying text.
111 See note 42 supra & accompanying text.
